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Book Revie'N 
The Academic Tournament over 
Executive Compensation 
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 
OF EXECUTIVE (OMPENSA TION 
B y  Lucian B ebchukt and Jesse Friedtt 
C ambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, Pp. xii, 2 7 8 .  $24 .95  cloth. 
Reviewed by William W. Brattont·'tt 
Executive pay brings o ut the worst in the corporate-governance sys­
tem. No economic theory tel ls us the terms of an "optimal'' pay arrange­
ment that penalizes failure while rewarding effort and merit i n  j ust the right 
increments. Absent such a first-best template, we must rely on contracting 
practice and experience to teach us on a trial-and-error basis. But contract­
i ng practice provides an inadequate economic laboratory because firms 
herd to a smal l  set of arrangements. 1 Critics charge that the practice also 
reflects a dysfunctional agency relationship. They complain that giveaways 
abound, despite an across-the-board shift towards i ncentive pay <mange­
ments, despite the transparency mandates of a thick stack of regulations. 
despite the shaming strategies of i nstitutional investors, and despi te fre­
quent exposes of excess i n  the vigilant business press. And even as man­
agement h as its defenders, none of them claim it to be underpaid. 
M any find this unsatisfactory situation puzzl ing. Why should a boon­
doggle persist i n  the teeth of the triumph of shareholder capital ism over the 
moribund managerial ist model of the postwar peri od':' Why, despite markeT 
controls, process protecti ons, reporting requirements, and press rq;orts. 
should compensation arrangements so clearly fa i l  to measure up under the 
standard of arm's- length contracting':' In Pay 1Yithout Performance: The 
Unfu!jil!ed Promise of Executive Compensation, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse 
Copynght .c 2005 California La11 Rclicw. Inc. Calitomia La\\. ReYJCI\. Inc. (CLR) 1s �� C::lttcm:re� 
nonprotlt curporation. CLR and the authors are solelv rc:sponsible for the comcnt uf their nublic'<:tion • .  
. , F'ricdman Professor uf Lm1·. Economics & Flllancc. Hacn1rJ L11v School. 
, .. r. ProfcssorofLa1v. Schuol or Law. Lnl\ersJtv ufCliifornia. Bcrkckv (Bualt lL1ii) 
···rr· Professor of Law. l!corgeto\\11 Un1versitv Law Center. 
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Fried pose a cogent answer t o  these quest ions: managers possess and effec­
t ively wield pmver, ensur ing that so-called i ncent ive pay comes on easy 
terms (4-5, 61- 1 17). Bebchuk and Fried also offer a s imple prescrip­
t ion: given that the vict ims of the i mbalanced arrangement are the s hare­
ho lders and that management empowerment causes the injury, i t  follows 
that a plausible cure must i nclude shareholder empowennent ( l 0- 1 2 , 1 89-
2 1 6). According to the authors, current executi ve compensat ion  practice 
demonstrates that the separati o n  of ownershi p  and control ident ified by 
Berle and Means more than seven decades agoc s t i l l  hobbles shareholder 
capi tal i sm. 
Bebchuk and Fried's in tervent ion cuts against  the gra in  of  academic  
consensus on corporate governance. Berle and Means supposedly were 
long ago cons igned to the dust b in  o f  i ntellechwl h istory . The i r  admoni t ion 
against concentrated management power had i ts day as  a corporate­
governance paradigm during the mid-twentieth century, but the t itans of  
contemporary financial economics have long s ince favored h igh-tech, mar­
ket-oriented constructs over Berle and Means's description3 In Pav 
J1'irhow Pe1formance, Bebchuk and Fried confront these t i tans, d ism iss ing 
their '''official' v iew of executi ve compensat ion'' ( 1 5 -22). 
And the t i tans have responded. Prime among them are Kevi n  M urphy, 
the leading academic analyst  of executive compensat ion,  and M i chael J en­
sen, the progeni tor of the "nexus of  contracts" theory of the firm. Jensen 
Z>nd Murphy ' s  combined work prov ided crucial academi c  i mpetus i n  the 
1990s for the movement to equi ty-based executi ve compensat i on.-' Bengt 
Holmstrom, Steven Kaplan,' and other economists11 now join Jensen and 
Murphy in the push back against Pay Without Performance. 
This academic contest offers intriguing lessons for students of  corpo­
rate governance. Thi s  i s  not a convent ional debate pitt ing left agai nst r ight 
or ant i-management against pro-management fact ions .  It is i nstead a 
Sc·c ADOLF .-\. BERLE & C..IRDJ:\�1{ C. \! E.\:\S. THE iV!U!l�IC\ C<>RP<JRA !!<>'-; & PRI\ .HI· 
i·'r;<•I'F!<IY (rc' ed .. Transaction [-'ublisilcrs \99i) 1193.21. .-\ppropric�tcly. Bcbchuk and Fried 1mukc 
8crk· clnd \.-kc•n:; ac rhc book's commencement. See BLGCIIL'l( & FR!EIJ. P-\ Y \'i!THOUT PE!<fOR\1\:\C!: 
T!iF U'HTFILLHJ PRO!IIISE OF E:\F.CUTIVE CO\!PE"iS.·\TION (20041. at I 5. 
SC'c \Vii !tam \V Bratton. Bale und ·\.fcuns Reconsidered ur rite Ccni!I!T "s Turn, 26 J. CORP. 
760-!i') (2110 i ). 
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'!0 J. P<>l.. Ecoi\. 225 (llJ9iJl [hereimtkrJenscn & \1\urphy 1990]: \lichac\ C. Jensen & 
\luqJhv. CEO lncl.'111i\·cs---!r's .\'or Hn" .\!uch l'nu Pu1·. Bur Hrn<. H.\R\. Bus. Rr:v. \!Iav-.lunc 
r 1 '·JC<i:l [hereinafter Jensen & Murphy HBRJ . 
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un·l !fh,,rS li-,·,m.c:' 10-1-l iECCI FtnclllCC \Vorkrng Paper :\o. 20:20031. umiluhlc ur 
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Tl:unLlS. in Cl)l1l11lCilting u:1 t3cb.__·huk and Frit:d. 5·L'C John E. Cure ;:·t :ll . . !\ CEC) 
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contest for shareho lder capita l ism's h igh ground. Bebchuk and Fried and 
their i nterlocutors make their cases in a t ightly delimited framework.- All 
parties disassociate themse lves from complain ts about the level of man­
agement compensation (8-9) . Bebchuk and Fried's overpayment  case thus 
does not turn on the fact that the average S&P 500 chief executive officer 
(CEO) made th irty t imes more than the average production worker in 1 970 
but 2 1 0  t imes more in 1 996.0  It is not the amount of pay that bothers them 
but rather the fai lure to make big payoffs to managers contingent on their 
creating shareholder value (6, 9). The debate over Pav J:Vithout 
Pe1formance, then, amounts to an i ntra-famil i al quarre l with in  the group 
that posits shareholder value maximization as the firm's objective. Those 
who view fi.rms ' core objectives d ifferently, favoring s takeholder capi tal­
ism or the harmonizati o n  of  the finn's financial reward system with that 
prevai l i ng in outside society, wi l l  find no a l l ies on either s ide9 
Bebchuk and Fried come to the tabl e  with impeccabl e  credentials as 
proponents of shareholder value maximization, but ne i ther hes i tates to 
criticize prevailing inst i tutional  anangements. Nor  does e i ther display the 
reflexive aversion to regulatory so lut ions so common among corporate in­
stitutions' contemporary observers . Thus positioned. Bebcbuk and Fried 
thrmv down the gauntlet, demanding that the economists either defend the 
prevailing compensation practice, explaining how it demonstrates a free­
market success story. or join them i n  condemnation. The opposition has 
risen to the challenge, counter ing Bebchuk and Fried's management-power 
description and offeri ng theori es to just ify prevailing pay practices . 
This revievv looks at the state of play i n  this academic tournament. 
Three defenses of the prevailing compensation practice have been mooted. 
First, much of what Bebchuk and Fried explain as results of executive 
povver also can be explained in  tem1s of the economic relationship between 
risk and return. ln this view, higher r isks attending equity-based pay must 
7. l3cbchuk cl!ld Fried reject the hypothc:;is that sc:l!'-cstc<clll :1lunc motives lllJ!lcrg,:ro;: in their 
cl(CliU!lL !HOney n1atr.cr� mor·�. See BEI3CHUK & FRIED. supru note 2. at X. They al�u do nut cunfrunt 
altc:rnati\·c <.'.\pia nations l)f performance: pay. For Jn c;;ampk of a comrasting thcorctic:d approach. sec' 
hl\\·ard P. Lazear. Oulj!/11-Bus!'d Pur-- lnc�nrin's. Rcrcnriun u1· Suuing:' i I Z!\ [)i:;uJssion Papct· :'-<<>. 
/(,I . 20U3). umiluhll' ur httr: ·. ssrn.com!abstract=-+03900. Lazear rejects the: notioil thc11 pcl·i'cnnnnu: 
inL·cnti,·es h:t\·c anything tu do ,,· ith obscrYcU cxccuti\·c ray rractict?:-i. citing the �1bsencc or· dn,,·nsick 
penalties . He prup,.lses that �quity-based pay ameliorat<:s information asymnlc:trJcs. The C.\ccutil c. :.rn 
infornwtiunctl insider. tradc:s ks:; ris�y cJsh compensation for riskier cquit.:-' compcnocllion so "' to 
r<.:chollt·� out,;ickrs. This leads to the prediction that equity-ba:;ed compclh<ltic•n is more lih:cl\' tu apl·":ar 
\\·h�n the linn·s production funcrion is littk unJcrstood �tnd infonn�ttion i:-; lL!rJ tll gk:1n. /:./_ �It 2-.� 
L�1zcar'� prnpo�ition n1akc� ::-;ensc but docs not undercut Bdx·huk and fried. \\·hu ;;uggcst th��t t!h:: 
illSiJcr gd:-: tnn:-..: ·_..;tuck llnn is n��cdcd to rectify the inforn1ation �ls�.'n!nl'.:il·y _-.. ;�_·:_' f�rncHt·� ,\ FRH·:n. 
,·ueru no!_•-:: 2. at 7. 
;-;_ I(.:,· in .i. \Iurrhy. Exccuti\·c Con1pt.·nsation 51 (Apr. ! 09:-.:) 1 unpublishe-d n:�1nu�<:rlpt 1. 
,n·ui/uh/e Ul http:- s,;rn.C0il1'C\bstrclCt= 163l) 1-f [hcr�ina!'tcr \Jurphy Jl)l):\ j. 
9. C./ .\n�:bwwi. supru note l, at 36-39 (suggesting�! cle� ... :riptiun t)f pa�; pr�1�..:ticc fplk�\\-!t1� :_� 
rc��n1 pnH.lu�tion 1nodcl)_ 
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be compensated with higher upside payouts, and the practice embodies an 
arm's-length trade-off. Bebchuk and Fried respond that the risks can be 
addressed without sacrificing performance sensitivity. Since they accept 
the economists' base point that the amount paid to executives matters less  
than the mode of payment, it  fol lows that enhanced performance sensitivity 
can be compensated with higher upside p ayouts. The problem, they con­
tend. is the finns' failure to draw on a long existing menu of performance­
sensitive techniques in the first p lace .  Second, the defenders posit an in­
formational shortcoming: boards incorrectly believe that stock options are 
a bargain mode of compensation, underestimating their costs in c ompari­
son to cash payments. Bebchuk and Fried find this implausible in a world 
\Vhere chief executive officers fill a majority of board seats . Third. the de­
fenders note that managers on the whole have done well for shareholders 
since the early 1 990s' shift to performance pay. As to this, Bebchuk and 
Fried respond with the shareholder-value norm itself: one takes it seriously 
or one does not; if one does, apologies fail  as justifications . 
Both sides score points in this back-and-forth. But significant conces­
sions have been accreting on the defensive side . There results a clear vic­
tory for Bebchuk and Fried. They win the match when the detl.:nse 
acknowledges that management power matters .  This seemingly meager 
concession changes the terms of discourse in a field that expunged the con­
cept of power from its positive account more than two decades ago . The 
erasure accompanied the transition from social theory to economics as the 
primary language of description.10 The reappearance of "power'' in the de­
scription 11 causes the burden of persuasion to shift from the critics to the 
defenders of prevailing practices. The question then tums to whether mate­
rial improvements to pay practice are feasible. When the ans\ver turns out 
to be yes, the debate ends in favor of Bebchuk and Fried. 
Part I of this review sets out Bebchuk and Fried's power-based de­
scription of the framework in which firms set the terms of executive em­
ployment contracts. Part I I  assays the descriptive a lternatives the defense 
put:; fonvard and Bebchuk and Fried's responses thereto. Given a positive 
:1ccount that focuses on a single e lement (power) in a complex institution 
(corporate govemance ), one vvould expec t  the defense to highlight other 
factors motivating existing compensation practice ,  as it has done. But the 
crit1cs do not succeed in invalidating Bebchuk and Fried's diagnosis. 
[nclecd. as Part III shows, the distance between Bebchuk and Fried and 
their '.:ritics has so narrowed as to change the tenor of the debate. which 
i :1 i c::m re•::1ll unlv c'llC paper bv a legal thecmst published during: the last t\Yc:nty vc::w; that 
)Vl\\'CT ::it the c<.:·nr(.?r nt' it:.: description nf the large corporatio:1. See Lynne L. Dallas. T'.tD .\-kir.!els 
·,;;l'''ruic Gm·eni<II!Ci': Bemnd Eerie und Mf'm?s. 22 C. MICH. J.L. REFOR\1 i 9 ( 1 91-iS). 
\: rt�ccnt years others ha\·e used ··intlucncc costs" as a 111orc neutraL less thrcc_tkning rhr(L-;c:-
8..:-b�._·huk : ..:nd Fried call "jlU\\·cr"' .. Sc'e PALL I'vlJLGRO.\l & ]OH:\ RoBERTS. I�c: J.'·Jl\\lC _'-:. 
:\-: lt 1·-.: [J \I\'...: -\:;!-_\:L".:T .209-7�< ( i 992 L 
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now devolves into a disagreement over subtle differences o f perspective 
respecting generally acknowledged shortcomings in compensati on practice. 
Part Ill also takes up Bebcbuk and Fried's p rescriptions. Here they con­
front political rea l i ties. The s ignificant law reform needed to effect share­
ho lder empowem1ent vvi l l  not occur anyti me soon. Thi s  l eaves Bebchuk 
and Fr ied playing a hortatory role in a self-regulatory dialogue. That task 
reta ins importance. for boardroom practice \o.r il l  never change absent robust 
criticism like that advanced in Por IVirhout Performance. 
THE CHARGE 
Bebchuk and Fried charge that governance structures empo\ver top 
managers, who. subject only to loose normat ive constraints, use their 
power to extract rents disguised as i ncentive p ay. F irst. Bebchuk and Fried 
acknowledge the obv ious : CEO compensation has ballooned ( 9-l 0 ) ,  \Vith 
total remuneration increas ing by more than e leven t imes i n  the past thirty 
years . Next, the authors fix arm's-length bargaining as their normative base 
point 1 c  and assert that pay would be t ied to perfom1ance at arm's length. 
More particularly. an arm ·s- length compensation  scheme would ( 1 )  pay 
enough to retain execut ives; (2) encourage executives to increase the 
value of the firm; and (3) avoid terms that reduce firm value ("inefficient 
terms'·). Finally, the authors describe impediments to arm ' s-length bargain­
ing. including the structure of the board (which promotes cozy relation­
ships with CEOs). the lack of substantial outs ide shareholders. and anti­
takeover arrangements. These prevent the market from influencing com­
pensation pol icy. Top managers emerge with power over directors. They 
use their po\ver to extract "rents." defined as more favorable benefits than 
those available under an arm's-length bargai n  ( 4-5). In theory, "outrage 
costs''�intluential outsiders' expressions of d isapproval�should limit 
these rents (5. 65) ln practice. however, firms resort to "camouflage·· to 
minimize outrage costs. reducing transparency by disguising or h iding in­
efficient payment terms ( 5. 70) 
Bdxhuk and Fricd'ci case requires a two-part proof. First, they must 
sh01v that managers do exercise pmver over directors. Next, they must 
demonstrate that the res u lting pay structure is not keyed to shareholder 
value creation. 
12. I�EUCHI·;� :\:: l:i·�!!�u . . \UfFd :1ut...:: �- �tt ; �;-J -�J. Jensen Jnd \lutvhy describe�� :-;in1ii�lr b�L;c pl�inl. 
ilOting. th:-:t th:: !inn fl,�c;-; the rckliionsh!p bc�·-x::�..�n lhc �nlh.lti:H of jXlY conceclr·?d ����d ihc :�bility lO �lti_r;.:r�·i 
:_-,::tt'-:r ·.'n1pluy .  ;r.,;;-.:_ \1it:h:lcl C .kn:;,�n 8: K::\·in J \lurphy. Hl.:'munerurirJn. Jf:llLTC u·e·\·c Bcf·n. h'o11· J!'c 
c�nr :'oll,:_r,�· 11'/;ot urc !lil' r1ru/:-i. __ -n.':· .. u;; • ./ f{o:!· i(• F'ix Th�_'IJI ."20-� 1 iHaiY. :\0\1 \Vorking P::L�"'J·..:r >�D. ;q_ 
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A. Power 
Power is hard to prove, which helps explain why it disappeared from 
economically informed descriptions of corporate institutions.13 In contrast, 
one can easily verify money payments. Overall CEO compensation in­
creased sixfold over the last two decades. 14 Average total remuneration of 
executives of S&P 500 companies (adjusted for inflation) grew from 
$8 50.000 in 1970 to $14 million in 2000, falling with the stock market to 
S9.4 million in 2002 .15 Average base salaries, on the other hand, increased 
only from $850,000 to $2 .2  million during the same period.16 The bulk of 
these compensation increases, therefore, resulted from "incentive" pay. 
To demonstrate a causal connection between management power, 
which is not observable, and the payoffs, which are, Bebchuk and Fried 
draw on the arm's-length bargain model, crucially but reasonably assuming 
that an ann 's-length deal would tightly tie pay to performance. They then 
draw inferences from real-world institutions, showing that governance ar­
rangements are ill suited to foster arm's-length bargaining between top 
managers and their corporate employers. Four factors, all well known to 
students of corporate govemance, contribute to this debility. First, the 
board itself is vveak because process infirmities bind outside directors to 
the CEO, by virtue of either fear or unflagging loyalty. Large board sizes, 
CEO chainnanship, interlocks,17 and financial dependence on CEOs all 
decrease directors' abilities to bargain effectively (80-82). Second, most 
firms lack a substantial outside shareholder, whose financial interest would 
otherwise influence bargaining over pay (82-83 ) .  Third, oversight by large 
institutional shareholders tends to lead to more sensitive pay arrangements, 
and some firms have fewer large institutional shareholders than do others 
( 83 ). Fourth, even for firms with large institutional shareholders, anti­
takeover arrangements insulate most managers from the discipline the 
market for corporate control otherwise would impose (83-85). 
In Bebchuk and Fried's view, the system's built-in checks do not suf­
fice to cmTect this imbalance and ensure that shareholder interests domi­
nate. Consider, for example, the shareholder vote. Reelection to the board 
remains a practical certainty for most independent directors, at least so long 
as they remain on the CEO's good side (25-2 6 ) .  The annual election 
I' · -'· The other reason is political. ProgressiYe critics of corporations assert that power implies 
responsibility: corporate power. once identified. JUStities regulatory constraints. See \Vi!liam \V 
hratlon & Jos,:ph A. :vlcCahery. The Equilihriu111 Content u(C(}Ipomre Fedewii.\111 23-24 IGco. La\\. & 
f:.con. Rcs'-'arch P�rper ;-..Ju. 606481. 2004 ). m ui/ohle ur http:!-'ssrn.cotn· abstract�6U64S I 
I -L l·blmstr(im & Kaplan. supm note 5. at I 0 
15. Jensen & Murphy. sutJru note 1 2. at 2-l. 
16. !d 
17 Fm c\:rmpk. \\·here an ourside director of Firm I is the CEO of Firm 2. nm! th•: CEO uf Finn 
i is •.JUIS!ck director at Finn 2. concerns ol· reciprocity ,,·ill prevent either h>m objecting to the other·s 
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accordingly does not amount to a s ign ificant threat . Nor do other sh are­
holder votes much m atter. Up-down votes on i ncentive compensation arc a 
b lunt instrument that shareholders rarel y  wie ld  and are no subst i t ute for 
rea l  back-and-forth negot iat ion (49-5 1 ) . 
Meanwhi le,  the rewards and norms of the system encourage board­
room co l leg ia l i ty (27-28 ,  3 1 -3 3 ) .  B ack scratching preva i l s-there is a rea­
son why 67% of outside d irectors are active or fonner C EOs ( 3 3  ) . 1 '  Other 
outside directors may be  free of this structural b i as towards C EOs. but they 
suffer no reputation loss when they go a long wi th a lax pay dea l .  To avoid 
l os ing face, the board needs only to stay i n  the range of acceptabl e  com­
pensat ion . 1 9  And even if  an i ndependent director had an inc l inat ion to get 
tough and find her way onto a compensat ion  committee, t ime and i n forma­
t ion constraints woul d  l imi t  her effectiveness.  Captured compensation con­
sul tants20 continue to take the lead in pay-setti ng ( 3 6- 3 9 ) .  Thus 
camouflaged through comparisons to pay increases in  l ike  fi rms.  on the 
surface compensation appears legit imate (70-7 1 ) .  
Market constraints do not i mpress B ebchuk and Fried, who perce i ve 
that the stock market checks only b igger, h igher-profi le  wealth transfers 
( 5 3 - 5 8 ) .  The executive employment market s imi l arly fa l l s short. Contrary 
to casual appearances, the rate of  executive firing increased on l y  s l ight ly  i n  
the 1 990s (4 1 -42) .  Furthermore, the holder o f  the top j ob has n o  in cen t i ve 
for further promotion within the firm. The poss ib i l i ty of moving on to an­
other, b igger firm only strengthens the C EO ' s  reso lve to get a goud pack­
age, for under preva i l ing c ustom a h iring finn compensates a new C E O  for 
the value o f  any unvested equity compensation at  the C E O ' s  o ld  fi rrn ( :'i '-1- ) .  
I n  sum, cuJTent inst i tut ional  structures d o  not foster arm ' s- l ength barga in ­
ing and instead a l low C EOs to exert power. 
B. Rents 
Having estab l i shed that the governance framework inv i tes slac k .  
Bebchuk and Fried then show in detai l that pay pract ices fal l  short o t· t he  
arm 's- length standard. This  presentation takes up  most of  the  book .  Much 
of it addresses stock-opt ion programs . More shocking to the rcadcr i3 a 
long l i st of l ucrat ive be l l s  and whist les : retirement pensions,  de ferred c o m ­
pensation,  post-retirement perquis i tes, and  consult ing fees, a 1 1  of  which  arc 
performance-insens i t ive and eas i l y  h idden in supplemental ret i rement p l an 
disc l osures rather than broadcast in  the compensation tab l e  i r: c l u cL:d i n  the 
annual proxy statement (95 -99 ) .  
1 ::; .  B.::bchuk and r ricd note that 4 ! 0 ,  o f  d irectors arc act i1·c e .\ecut i 1 c s l'. h i k  2 T' . , �t r·� rct i ;·,,,_: 
H a l f  arc C EOs. 
19 .  !d a t  3-l-36 .  
20. f l i storica l ly.  management engage:; Jhe com pensation consultant .  �l SS Lirl ng a Lll\lr:. ,bk ; · .; !·,,_, , , _  
For Jhe c lassic account o f  the consu ltat ion proce:;s.  see GR,\EF S .  C R \'S\ .1 1 . .  h S t:.\ f{C I J  r . > J '  L '\ C i' \o :  T :::­
O n: RCI'> \ !PEt' SATJU:o; or- A IJ E RJc.-�:-.: E'\ ECUTJI  ES 43-50 ( I  99 1 ) .  
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Bebchuk and Fried contend that stock-option plans fail t o  mot ivate 
perfo rmance, singling out exercise prices, numbers of options granted, and 
vesting rules. Their main complai nt goes to price. Companies almost uni ­
versally fix the option ' s  exercise price a t  the stock price a t  the time they 
grant the option. A low-powered incentive results because the executive 
will be in the money so long as the stock price does not go down and stay 
down during the grant ' s  ten-year life. A stronger incentive would follow if  
companies priced options out of  the money, that i s .  above the stock ' s  mar­
ket price; but only 5% do so ( 1 60) .  The common practice of leaving the 
price fixed for the life of the opt ion also reduces the incentive effect. A 
fixed price rewards the executive for market-wide and sector-wide upward 
price movement in addition to upward movement due to the company 's  
own performance (said to  account for only 30% of stock gro·wth on  aver­
age) .  Because the market tends to rise over time, a payoff is virtual ly guar­
anteed. 
Bebchuk and Fried propose two potential ways to increase options '  
incentives. First, indexing would reset the exercise price upward and 
downward over time to filter out changes attributable to the market or sec­
tor .  Alternatively, companies could condition vesting on meeting a fixed 
performance target ( 1 39-42 ) .  Neither palliative is cu!Tent practice, despite 
the obvious incentive benefits. 
Bebchuk and Fried further argue that fewer stock options would be 
better. According to the empirical evidence they cite, the positive margi nal 
effect of stock options on a manager ' s  incentives declines as the number of  
stock options granted increases, and the benefits o f  the last  option granted 
may be less than the cost ( 1 3 8) .  ' 'Reloading," or the automatic grant of a 
new option each time the holder exercises an existing option, is also a 
problem for the authors, because it enables the executive to lock i n  protec­
tion against a subsequent decline in the stock price, perversely turning 
stock price volatility into a source of personal profit ( 169-70 ) . .::1 
Finally, Bebchuk and Fried believe that managers should not be al­
lowed to sell their incentive stock. Under the prevailing practice, once the 
option vests ,  the exercising execut ive is free to se l l  the underlying stock. 
Cunently, executives do sell 90% of the stock purchased upon exercise 
( 1 76 ) .  No nefarious intentions need be read in. They sell in order to diver­
sify their portfolios ,  acting no differently from other rational investors . But 
Bebchuk and Fried object to the concession of free transfer, arguing that 
restraints on alienation and on hedging would tie the execut ive · s  i nterest 
2 1 . Bebchuk and Fried also ck;appro1·e of th<:: pral' t i cc o i' sub,;t i tu t i ng n t::l\ �r�mt,; �ll a l c''"�l 
c:wrc i sc pr ice  for grants that e.\pirc: out of the llll ncy. S<!(' B F AC H LT .  & fRIE i l .  Sllf!I'U n utc 2. at ] (, .5 - 6 7  
Fonncrly t h a t  ;·cs tl l t  � ! s o  \\·as accon1 p i i shcd by an1en J i n g  the p ! �1n to lU\\··�r t h e  pri�.-·t: _  a p r�; c t i c c  t l u t  
c ... 'a:�cd .. ,·hen tht:· Financ i al .-\ccot!n t i ng Stand�lrd:-' IJo�ud changed t h e  :lccount i n g  tr�Jln1cnl in  J l)9S .  
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c loser to long-term value creation within the firm ( 1 74-7 7 ) . 2:. And, al­
though bad motives need not be read in, nefarious deeds do occur. Some 
executives use inside in fo rmation to time their sales . Here too, conection 
would be easy-executives should be forced to disclose their sales in ad­
vance ( 1 7 8-83 , 1 9 1  ) .:.3 
Bebchuk and Fried also target cash bonus structures, depicting them 
as even worse than stock-option plans .  Stock-option p lans, however lax 
their construction, have the great merit of conditioning rewards on the 
stock price, which in tum is determined by free-market actors .  Cash bo­
nuses can be structured the same way, but tend not to be. Bonus revvards 
frequently depend on meeting targets within the payees ' control that have 
no necessary connection \Vith bottom-line performance improvement­
targets such as spending al l  the funds in an annual budget or,  worse. c los­
ing an acquisition .  When payees fai l  to m eet their performance targets, the 
targets are often lowered ex post ( 1 24-2 7 ) .  There also are bonuses on entry 
and exit. Bonuses for signing are unsurprising, assuming a competitive 
market for the best managers .  Bonuses for leaving, whether by firing, re­
tirement, or acquisition, are a little more disturbing, competitive market or 
not ( 89) .  Bebchuk and Fried report that the average severance package 
equals three or more years of compensation, with only 2 'Yo of firms reduc­
ing it in the event the CEO finds new work ( 1 34) .  Firing, argue B ebchuk 
and Fried, should not be a cash bonanza for executives ( 1 3 2 -3 5 ) .  This is o f  
course j ust what happened when Disney threw out M ichael Ovitz, a golden 
goodbye that led to a derivative action that challenged the Disney board' s  
good faith; the action miraculously survived the defense ' s  motion t o  dis­
miss . 2� I ronically, Disney ' s  defense counsel might very well have cited to 
Bebchuk and Fried in support of the argument that the corporation did 
nothing unusual . 
Bebchuk and Fried also take a parting shot at restricted stock, vi�\ved 
by many pay consultants and commentators as a healthy alternative ro 
stock options .  The case for restricted stock builds on the dynamics of op­
t ion valuation :  options gain in value as the firm ' s  stock becomes more 
volatile, perversely tying the wealth of an executive option ho lder to ;tuck 
' '  The extent o f  the l imitat ions would b e  subject t o  negot ia t ion .  Bebch u k  and Fried note th<lt the 
practice I S  changing. with tinm adopting target ownership plans. They complain that the targets are 
tO\\ . ho\l n er See B E!lC H U K  & FRI ED . .  Wpl'll note 2. at 1 76-77 .  
2 .1 .  A l so di sturbing are loans nwdc to  finance  purc hases of  company stock. n o w  !'roh ib i t.:d by th,; 
Sarbane,;-Oxky Act uf 2002. Pub. L. "io l 0 7-204. � 402( a).  1 1 6 Stat .  7 8 7  (200 2 1 .  These \\ ere o ften  
fL) rg i l· e n .  \': i th  forgiveness impl icat ing �n addi t i o n <d payment o f  2 5°1o gross  up to  c'OI·e;- the i ncomc tcr:' 
pc1ycrbk L)ll l oan fmg i \·ene s s . B E BC H U� & FRIED.  supra note 2. at 1 1 6 .  Alternat i\·eh·. t h e  nccutin: 
" uuid  burro11· money from the  tirm to C'.crcise s t o c k  options and later s e l l  the >.t,v�k b�t l' k  tu the lirm tc' 
repay the luan. taking ad\ antage of :1 pre-Snrbanes-0.\ ley loopho l e that rerrnittecl the exccut i l·c · s  report 
uf th.: stock sak to be cle layccl u n t i l  fort1·-fi1·e days after the end of the tiscal year. BEBC H u.;  & F1: t ED. 
,-uJ N·a nutc �- n t  1 1 7 .  
2---L Se·�' in n::' T h �  \V�1 ! t  D i::'ncy C o .  Dcri\ ·ati\ ·c L i t i g n t i o n .  R�5  A . 2d 275  ( De l .  C � :  .� dO __ ; ;  
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volat i l i ty .  Award i ng t h e  stock outr ight  avoids that p robl e m .  B e b c h u k  and 
Fr ied agree that stock ownersh i p  can  prevent  execut ives from b enefit i n g  
from volat i l i ty,  subj ect  t o  t h e  c aveat that  t h e  execut ive b e  proh i b i ted fro m  
s e l l i n g  the stock.  B ut they note that an opt ion p l an c a n  j ust  as eas i l y  IT­
stra in  a l ienation .  They also ra ise a loud object ion :  restricted stock i s  a n  op­
t ion vv ith an exerc i se pr ice of zero,  and there is  n o  reason to b e l i eve zero i s  
an opt imal  exerc i se pr ice  ( 1 70-7 1 ) . T o  see the i r  po int c o mpare th e award 
of an opt ion  to b uy 1 00 shares at  $ 1 00 and an outright grant of 1 00 s h a re s , 
both awarded w i th the stock tradi n g  for $ 1 00 .  Assume that the stock p r i c e  
dec l ines to S 8 0  o n  t h e  d a y  after  t h e  grant a n d  stays at S 8 0  forever because 
the firm i s  badly managed.  The h o l der o f  the option is  \\ i p e d o ut ;  the  
h older of the s tock emerges w i th e ighty cents  o n  the do l l a r  desp i te poor  
performanc e .  C urrent  movement to restricted stock rather  than i n dexed 
op t i ons thus confirms Bebchuk and Fried ' s  rent-col lec t i on ch arge . 
C. SummwT 
Bcbchuk and Fried do not prove beyond doubt th at t h eir inventory of 
devices for greater performance sens i t iv i ty  wou l d  work exact ly as  they pro­
j ec t .  Preva i l ing pract ice has had perverse effects: � ' more c o u l d  b ,_: in t h e  
offi n g  under a rev i sed practice .  B u t  Bebchuk a n d  Fr ied d o  n o t  h a v e  to 
prove t h i s  counterfactual  negat i ve .  They acknmvl edge t lK� pre di c tab l e  prob­
lem:.; and suggest p laus ib l e  means o f  c o unteri n g  them. The m ost important 
p ro b l e m  concerns t i me h or izons .  Stock-option pl ans h avt: tended to bi2s  
managers tmvards short-term resu l ts ,  i n  some cases '.v ith di sas trous conse­
quences .  B u t  as Bebchuk and Fr ied show,  the problem c an be s o l ved by 
re st ra i n ts on a l i enat i on that lock  execut ives  into long- term pos i t i o n s  in lhc i r  
fi rms '  equ i ty . What is  needed i s  c arefu l l y  m o n i tored cxperi m e n tmi o n .  
w h i c h  h a s  been J acking for t h e  reasons Bebchuk and Fr ied  I de n t i ty .  
B ebchuk a n d  Fr ied t h us succeed w i t h  the i r  p ri ma fac i e  case.  ! t  s u ffices  
for them to show that corporate pay pract ic e represents a w i n d fa l L  w h i ch in  
turn imp l ies  CEO intl uence at  wor k .  S i gn i fi cantly. Bebchuk and Fr ied 
make no c la im to or ig ina l i ty for these bas ic  points .  They b u i l d  o n  a b o dy of 
ex isting discuss ions . 26 The purpose o f  the book is  to ga ther e x i s t i n g  l e arn­
m g  so as  to p lace the onus in  academ ic and pol i cy discuss ions on 
� :=; .  Se._'t'. L'._':-.!: - - s�nli Lt2\"11lOfC, Pu::::ling Srock ()ptiuns und Co!l/fN/1 ? \'Utinn i -t-9 Li _ P .. \. L .  
R c \  \ 91 1 \ .  \ LJ 3U  1 200 1 )  ( s uggesting that inckxcd opt1un:; c o u l d  achcrs c i v  Ot flc,:t i n '. cs t ;n·: n t  p u i t c •: ) . 
�h Pru fc:-;:-;ur E ison has been desc r i b i n g  ray pract ice  �h a func t icl l: u t' buJrd c�·;p tu t\.: in the kg�d 
l i tcr�ttur�..� fu:· yce:lrs. Sc(;' Charks \ ! .  E l son. Tlu.! [)uf.\" ( !! ' Cure. CuinjJensuiir rn. un.) Sto; ·,( ( h 1 -_i/r. _'.:·si.:i;J. r-. _3 
L .  C ! " .  L .  R r:_ \ ()49 .  65 1 ( 1 99 5 ) :  Ch�1rks \ I .  E b o n .  f)ii·cciuJ· i/;�_· 
Cu;' J /u; ·ed Buui ·d-- T/11! f-fisrr.ny (!( u ,)\mp!rJJll und u Cur:.-·. ) ( l  S \i U L. k f.- ··. t _ _  : i ) tJ-h-l- ( 1 c_H)(, l . .\ 
hypothes is a l so has �lppc�lrl.:'d i n  the ,.:�.: o n u r n i L· ! i tc:r�t tu t·:.:. Sl ·l· \ l :1 r i � t ll i � t: B�·n r�: nd  
.:._\: Sc-�Jd h i l  :\ l u l la i nath�llL .-igen!s J l 'irh ond u ·irhour Princi;;u/s. ·-) ( )  
\ [ a ri �1 fl l 1 • '  Bcrt r;.<. n J  �..'-( S c n d h i l  \ l u l l a i nath�tn . . --l r�._· CEOs R�'\ t ·u; ·dc'L ;  
. Ire . ! l h (U .  [co.'-: _  C)() ] 1 2 00 1 ) . 
!. ,, i.: ' 
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management' s  defenders. To evaluate the book' s  success, we accordingly 
must  see whether the defense rebuts the prima fac i e  case. 
I I  
T H E  DEFENSE 
B ebchuk and Fried ' s  economist interlocutors offer three re­
sponses: ( l )  executive pay anangements amount to rat iona l  employment 
contracts in which the employer concedes high retums to compensate for 
the risks of equity-based compensation ;  (2) any departure between actual 
compensation arrangements and those predicted by an arm 's-length­
bargaining model can be traced to the perverse effects of regulation and 
informational shortcomings of corporate decision makers; and ( 3 )  the 
q uantum of overcompensation i s  modest and the system w i l l  self-correct 
vvi thout regulation. A l l  three points have meritorious aspects, requir ing 
modifi cation of Bebchuk and Fried ' s  description. The i nterlocutors, how·­
ever, succeed ne i ther in displac i ng power from the posit ive account nor i n  
recast ing the \vindfall a s  a n  acceptable arm' s-l ength deal. 
The fol lowin g discussion takes up the three responses in tum, noting 
Bebchuk and Fried' s responses to each. The pr inc ipal interlocutor is Kevin 
Murphy. often writing i n  collaborat ion wi th Brian Hall or M ichael Jensen. 
A. R isk. Retum. and Optimo! Controcting 
Murphy and Hal l ' s  v iew of executive compensation contrasts sharply 
to that of Bebchuk and Fried. Rather than l ink ing compensation practice to 
exec utive power. they t ie  it instead to the economic relationship between 
r i sk  and return. c 7  Instead of linking compensation pract ice to executive 
power. they tie i t  i nstead to the economic  relationsh ip betvveen risk and 
retum . F rom the firm ' s  point of view, the cost of an executive stock option 
i s  the same as the cash consideration the firm would receive from a third­
p�n1y investor i n  the same option. However, third-party investors and firm 
emp l o yees v i •:\v the options in crit i cal ly different ways. Third-party i n ves­
tors arc ful ly  diversified and positioned to hedge the risk of the option ; ac­
corclingiy, they are risk neutral . :-�  Employees, on the other hand, are under­
diversifi ed and r isk-averse. so it follows that they value the option less than 
t h i rd parties . :' '! [t further follows that an option is an inferior form o f  com­
pensation compared to cash: to constitute $ 1  of pay in the  eyes of the em­
p loyee. option compensation must be increased to make up for the 
� � - SL·,__, .'-ft'J:'L-rlfl<r t � r ian .l . H�: l l  & Kc\ · in  .1 . \lurphy. Siock Optiuns _ /( ;r L 'nc lin!rsUir!d Ercculin_'s 
! ! ·L.t r '  '< C l \ l  \\ · ·Jrhng p ;_tp:;:·:· �\,.>. D0-0� .  �00.2 ) .  u \ ·u iluhle u! hnp :  _.,;:-;rn . c o n 1  abstr(lct=3 0..fl)(10 
l !h::·!...· i �-; , :(tcr !-L: : l  & \ ! u rp;1y 2002J .  
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emp loyee ' s  valuation discount. The option thereby costs the firm more 
than the $ 1  the employee subj ect ively receives .  An option n everthe less  
m ight make sense as incentive compensat ion .  But  the overal l  terms of  an 
arm ' s- length opt ion package wi l l  reflect the employee ' s  r isk avers ion .  
' 'Compensat ion," i n  M urphy and Hal l ' s  v iew,  thus includes rationa l  ad­
j ustments that otherwise seem l i ke giveaways,  such as exerc i se pr ices  set at 
the money rather than at a premium, the fai l ure to index the  exercise 
price ,30 and the a l l owance of both ear ly exercise3 1 and stock sa les  after ex­
erc ise . 32 Restat ing M urphy and H a l l ' s  po int, stock options may be  an inef­
fic ient mode of compensation, but the ineffic iency does no t  stem from 
management power. 
Murphy and H a l l  take direct aim at B ebchuk and Fried' s  p ower thesis  
with a reference to  p ayment d ifferentia ls  between inside and outside CEO 
hires .  If power were the generative factor, one would expect  to see inside 
CEO h ires paid more than outsiders, given that power accrues  to  ins iders 
whi le  outsiders deal more at am1 ' s  length .  [n pract ice the opposite occurs.  
Outside CEOs earn more, and industries with more prevalent outs ide h iring 
pay more 33 Overal l  numbers of outside C EO rep l acements have risen from 
between 1 5% and 1 7% i n  the  1 970s and 1 980s to j ust  over 25% today 3� 
The environment accordingly has become better suited to am1 ' s- l ength 
contracting. Yet because compensatio n  has i ncreased overa l l ,  M urphy and 
Ha l l  conc lude that power does not account for C EO salaries .  
Murphy also seeks to rebut Bebchuk and Fried ' s  assert ion of  C EO 
power by noting that l ower- level  executives and employees a l so  receive 
stock options.  If  option pract ice stems from the power of  top managers, 
then why are most employee options granted to those below the top team') 
I n  1 990,  less than 85% of option grants \vent to employees be low the top 
five; in 2002, 90% went to l ower- level  employees . 3 5  For M urphy, the ega l i ­
tarian grant pa ttern compounds t h e  ineffic iency prob lem, presenting t he  
more press ing problem of th e  two. S in c e  options are worth l e s s  to  empl oy­
ees thzm their  opportunity cost to the firm, opt ion compensation makes 
sense on ly when it  provides the best ava i lab le  means to the end of  high­
pmvered incentives.  This  i s  not the  case  wi th  lower- level  employees for 
whom intemal promotion and the prospect of eventual equity 
_iO .  S<!c" H a l l &: i\l urphy . s upru note 2 7 .  a t  3 .  
3 1  ld at 2 7 - 3 "2 .  
3 2 .  J uhn E .  Core e t a \ . .  E.rccurir "c' Equirl· Con?Jh'll.wlion und !nc<'lllir·n . .J Sun cT _i (l i hn .  9 .  
2 002 ! I unpubl ished manus c r i p t ) .  uwilubl<' u r  h t t p  ssrn com abstract=2764 2 5 .  p o i n ts out that i f  th •c 
cc.\CCut !\·c a l reauy holds the tirm·s stock Jt the t i me of the option grant and is al iL'''·ccl ro se l l  on a unc­
to-unc bas i s as opt i ons arc c:-;crc i scd. t he C\ecuti1·e 11· i l l place the same ,·,d ue on the: o p t i on n s  a th i ,·d-
"I "�  St':.-' \lurphy. supru no te 2 8 .  a t  R53 ( describ i n g  tottl con1pcnsat ion package� and C\.L'l'U t i ·:c 
�() l l )\.>� ) .  
�-L .kn ::\cn & \ l u rphy . . \llf)J·a note \ 2 . ar 32-3 .1 .  
3 5 .  /d. at J G .  
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compensation already provide i ncenti ves .  In addit ion, it i s  imposs ib le  to 
determine whose etlort within the general employee populat ion i mproves 
the stock price, presenting free-rider probl ems in an equity-based reward 
system 36 
Summing up this first p hase of  the defense, even if rent extract ion ex­
p l ai ns the incentive to reward top executives w ith stock options, i t  does not 
explain pay practice as a whole .37  A lthough compensation po l i cy c l early is  
suboptimaL managerial abuse of power is  not  l ike ly  the source of the p rob­
l em .  
Bebchuk and Fried answer th e  r isk-and-return cri t i c i sm w ith a s imple  
observat ion :  r isk can be compensated for without sacrific ing perfonnance 
sensi t ivity.  Reca l l  that B ebchuk and Fried accept Jensen and M urphy ' s  
base poi nt that the amount pa id  t o  executives matters l ess than the mode of 
paym ent ( 8 -9) 3s For B ebchuk and Fried,  as for Jensen and M u rphy, high 
compensat ion by itse l f  does not imp ly  a departure from the shareho lder­
value norm ( 20) .  Therefore, to the extent that r isk d iminishes the va lue of  
performance-sensi t ive ,  "reduced-windfa l l "  stock options ,39 the executive 
can be compensated w·i th a larger number of  such options ( 1 44 ) . 
Shareho lders wi l l  always prefer to concede this  l arger number i n  exchange 
for performance-sensit ive features ( 1 5 7 )�0-whil e  the rare executive who 
contributes value to the firm walks away with a b igger payoff, the larger 
number of executives who fai l  to outperfonn the market get no bonus at al l .  
F ina l ly, i f  pay packages i ndeed stemmed from an arm ' s- length  risk-return 
trade-off we would have seen reduct ions in cash compensation  to make up 
for the appearance of stock options in  the 1 990s ( 72-73  ). The absence o f  
such reductions rebuts t h e  impl icat ion of  a trade-off. Manageri a l - l evel  r isk 
avers ion does not  independently exp l ai n  the absence of  opt i ons wi th  pcr­
formance-sensi  t i  ve features . 
Bebchuk and Fried concede, as they must, M urphy ' s  po int that out­
s i de C E O  hires make more money than ins ide h ires, despite rhe apparent 
d i fferent ia l  in barga in ing  pmver. It fol lows that power does not determine 
.' h .  f3r i c;n .I . H a l l  & K c \  i n  j \l urphy. Tl1e Trouh!e " ir/1 Sruck OjJiiulls I 6- 1 I 1 H a n  ard \ 0 \ 1  
\\ or� i lli,!  f\q;cr \ o  03-33 .  � OO_i 1 .  imlilub/e ur h t t p :  ssrn.Clll11> :lbstract=-+ 1 5040 [ h c rc i n c; ftcr H a l l  & 
\ l urpl:y 21 1 1 ) .i 1 -
.) 7 _  /d. �tt 29 .  
' " · See J c'lbCI1 & \ l urph\ H B R  . .  \ l lfii"U note -l. at 1 3 �-39.  
� () - f,Jr i nst�1ncc. t h -:  mana�cr· s :iubjcL t i \-..� p�rccp t ion o f  r i s k  n1 ight  c1u�e t h e  \-�l l uc o f  th e U \ "CLl i l  
;·,�IY �����-.'LlgC tu f�: l l  b c ) o w  the c1.)111pc-nsat ion H1110unt set  through arm · s - l e ngth bz-trg(l i n i ng .  
40 .  .-\ lt <cm:; l i ., c l \ . pcrfurn1J!lcc-scns i l  i \ ·e contract ing tcchn iq u•.:s cJn be a p p l  i ,·d m lllll d i  tied 
;lYn1---�l :-; ta l l tb!"d i t�dL'.\ nccU nor b(' usct . l. For instanct.:.  the t.'\ecuti ,·c i n�tead c o u l d  be put in t i lt.? n1ont:) 
k··r i JUt rh:rt"unning 5 t l0 :1 uf  COi11pcti ng firn1s. B El)CH l "K '-'\:.. FR! ED . . \upro note �- at 1 56 .  
On� up;_·n  qt :c� ! iun i �  \\-hL· th(·r p u b l i c  o utrage ,,·ould restrain gri.l ! l ts  o r  r��duccd-\\· i n d fa ! l  
' ' i' l l <J n :; i n  i c tr�cr n u ; ·,lbcrs.  I kml to duubt i t :  the  uccas iona l  h i�h-prufi k  b i i,!  paY-otT ,,· ould gL' w c1 
i l 1 �i i � i fc-.-. l 1 y  �·-ucc(�:;s fu l  C\r�cut i \\? :  s i rn u l tancuusly.  less successfu l  C :\ c c u t i ,·c< op t i u n s  ,,·uuld l l1St; t h c : r  
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pay a l l  b y  itse l f  ( 8 5 ) .  I f  power were the only factor, w e  would a l so  expect 
to see rad ica l ly  d ifferent compensation pract ices in firms c ontrol l ed  by 
large shareholders, which is not in  fact  the case. -1 1  But Bebchuk and Fried 
st i l l  manage to push back a coup l e  of  steps against thi s  l ine o f  reasoning. 
They suggest that new CEOs w i l l  sti l l  have s ign ificant bargain ing power 
because the newcomer atta ins power on a prospective bas is .  For i nstance, 
dr iving a hard bargain y ie lds incumbent d irectors nothing, whereas reward­
ing an incoming CEO could h e lp  them retain the ir  board seats (39-4 1 ) .  
Thi s  point  does not  ful ly answer M urphy ' s , but i t  does deflate i t  somewhat.  
Bebchuk and Fried do not confront the point about option c o mpensa­
tion to lower- leve l  emp l oyees; i nstead, they l imit  the ir  ana lys i s  to the top 
tea m ' s  pay package. But one can extrapo late a pari ia l  response fro m  their  
descript ion of camouflaging tact ics .  A CEO, they say,  wil l  use  her power 
to inflate the pay p ac kage o f  other top executives in  order to  obscure her 
own rent extract ion (64 ) .  There is no reason why these "sp i l l over rents" 
should n o t tri ck le  down the h ierarch ica l  l adder. But the extrapo lat ion does 
not expla in the use of equity compensation to motivate lower- l eve l  em­
p loyees. Whi le Bebchuk and Fried may legi t imately cab in  the i r  descript ion 
to top team compensat ion, i t  does appear that factors i n  addi t ion  to C EO 
power and greed shape the use of  stock-opt ion compensat ion .  
Note that  one could infer an arm ' s- length trade from Jensen and 
M urphy ' s  r isk-and-return reading of  executive pay pract ice .  According to 
Bebchuk and Fried, th i s  i s  exactl y  what the financi a l  economists  have been 
doing. The " ' o ffic ia l '  v iew'' of  economics ,  they say, assumes an arm ' s­
l ength framework, d ismiss ing inconsistent pract ices as anomal ies  or  puz­
:d es ( 2 -3  ) . This  descript ion does not neat ly  characterize Murphy ' s  analys is ,  
however. Certa inly,  Murphy talks  of  puzzles  and disputes B ebchuk and 
Fri e d ' s  descript ion of the bargain i ng context. B ut infening strong assump­
ti ons from Murphy ' s  analysis as to ei ther the qual i ty of the c ontracting 
fi"amework or the evolut ionary traj ectory of compensation pract ices is d if­
fi cu lt .  A fter a lL  Jensen and M urphy themselves, i n  their famous 1 990 pa­
per. cr i t ic ized the pay practice of an earl ier era for i ts incons is tency with 
i�lrmal m odels  o f  optimal contract ing . -�2 Nor does their  later wri t ing assume 
that  optimal contracting has reduced agency costs to a min imal  figure. For 
. l cnsen and M urphy. agency costs are a sa l ient and pers istent probl e m .  
-L ! .  Rubc·rt D�1 i nc,; d a l . .  The Good. the Bad,  and the Lucky : C E O  Pay and S k i l l  4-6 ( U .  o f  Penn.  
: :;,;r �·or L1" S: Econ Rcs�Carch Pape1· 'Vlay 7.  2005) .  ami/ahle u r  http :iissm.com/absiract=o2222 3  
k;: t :; 1 •L-. h i n :;  : 1  star ist il· a l  l i n k  bet\l·een tinns w i th l :trge slwrd:oldcrs, h i g h  inceJllive pay. and successful 
P•-· :· J ',_.;·:nJn•_·c ) . T h e  l ink i n  I urn supports the power hypolhcsis-lo the exlcnt fi rms wirh large 
.; ! ; :.lrc-h , Jdcl·,; h:1 1 c more lk t� ns ib le  puformancc-basecl ray structure:; and lower pay l e1·c l s .  the 
.;_• _  .klh•c l l  & 'VI urphy. supru note - L  at 242-44 . O f  course, the ir  comp l a i m  then 11·as that C E Os 
· . .  -, •.:rc· cun·.p.:nsat ·.:d !11(>rc l i ke' bme�1ucrats I han l ike cnrr.:rrcneurs. ll' i th  on ly  a rri 1 · ia l  port i on ot' the i r  
•. • : : lpc·:;,;�l i i t>n b c ! ! E :  r i ed tu 1 n crc:!ses of sharchnldcr q J u c  !d. :11 2 6 1 -6 3 .  
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But putting Jensen and Murphy to one s ide,  what B ebchuk and Fried 
consider the "offic ia l  v iew" does prevai l i n  a body of  economic work on 
executive compensation .�3 This  schoo l ,  unl i ke the Jensen-Murphy ap­
proach,  makes a qua l ified predict ion of evol utionary con vergence on effi­
c ient outcomes. In  the short term, rents can be extracted, but on ly  because 
transaction costs prevent continuous recontract ing in response to events 
that change the part ies '  appraisals of  the values exchanged. S ign i ficant 
agency costs w i l l  thus persist but w i l l  become smal ler  and i ncreasingly 
anomalous over t ime.�� These writers infer optimal i ty from pay pract ice ,  
c it ing empirical  studies showing conelations between pay and 
"theoret ica l ly  sensib le  economic factors" such as fi rm size and transpar­
ency.�5 But they also make an  important admission:  the studies show coJTe­
lat ions vvi thout providing evidence of h igh or low points and do not reveal  
a robust relat ionship between incentives and performance .�6 
Two economists fro m  this school ,  John E. Core and Wayne R. Guay , 
writing with l aw professor Randal l  Thomas, have j oi ned the debate with 
B ebchuk and Fri ed.�7 Interestingly, Core, Guay , and Thomas concede that 
coq)orate contract structures reflect executive power and that more power 
means more pay.�x But they nonetheless hold to an opt imal i ty c la im,  at 
l east in  the fi rst-best-second-best sense.�9 That is, given contracting costs ,  
results wi l l  never be first best .  Compensat ion contracts neverthe less can 
ach ieve optimal results wi th in  a second-best framework, antic ipating prob­
lems such as CEO power and adj usting in advance . 5 °  Core, Guay, and 
Thomas accuse B ebchuk and Fried of  making an excessive demand with 
their normative base point of  ann' s -l ength bargains.  B ebchuk and Fried. 
they charge, complain about a N i rvana that does not exist, ' 1  seeking theo­
ret ica l  perfection in  a second-best world. A contract ,  they say ,  can be 
' 'optimal" without being ann ' s-length .52 
Core, Guay, and Thomas ' s  concept  of  optima l ity is  inte l l ig ib le  
enough. But  i t  i s  di fficul t  to make sense of  i ts appl ication i n  the context of 
executive compensat ion .  C erta in ly ,  recognizing that first-best o utcomes are 
imposs ib le  and seeking the best poss ib le  second-best ones makes sense a s  �l 
-L' . Sec generu/h· Core ct a l . .  supra note 32 ( summanzing the l i t�ralurc ). 
-!. --J. . Set' id at 2-3 .  
-+5 .  !d. a t  J 7 
-lh .  !d. a t ::'.:\ . 
.:\ 7  See Core � l  a l . .  supru note 6 . 
.+:-: Jd �ll I 1 60 . 
.:\lJ. F i rs t -best outcomes yie ld  zero we lfare losses .  :\ second-best Wllrid is on•: in \\·hich 
con,;tr�linl:i respect ing e i ther i n c e n t i \·cs or ins t i tu t ional  contc�t  rrc':cnt the a c h i c \ •�mcnt or a first-best 
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'\c�nnd bc:St" ntean� 1 h �1 t  actor.'\ ::tr� doing the best that can be clone in an i n1pcrfcct  cn\· i ronn1cnt . 
. ' I ' .  Cure ct  a l . .  supra note 6. a t  I I  (10-C1 I .  
� ! . !d �l t i ! 6 7 .  
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po l icy  obj ective in a n  i mperfect world .  B u t  why, given the concession of 
management empowerment, should we assume that pay practice i s  optimal 
even in  a second-best sense? A rational ,  empowered actor presumably 
takes more than does a rational ,  unempowered actor. The excess i s  rent  and 
i s  not even second-best within the nonnative framework of  a competit ive 
market .  So  the point carries only i f  ann ' s- length contracting and the com­
peti t ive market are i nappropriate bases for normative evaluat ion .  From a 
legal perspective, that point cannot carry: arm ' s- length contract ing i s  the 
t ime-honored normative yardst ick of the fi duciary l aw concerning self­
deal ing contracts.  From an economic po int  of  v iew, th ings could be d iffer­
ent.  It certainly is conceivable that p arties  who are not at arm ' s  length 
m ight contract opt imal ly .  For that to happen, however, the parties  need a 
theoretical template directing them to the maximum p ayoff Unfortunately ,  
economics has not yet  offered such an "obj ective optimali ty" templ ate for 
CEO compensation .  So  we are l eft wi th  the question as to how the fie ld  can 
expect the pract ice to evolve in  a first-best-second-best direct ion based on 
trial and enor when the bargain ing parties  are not deal ing at arm ' s  length. 
That cal ls for m arketplace magic of  a h igh order. 
l f we extend Core, Guay, and Thomas ' s  concept of robust governance 
practice to i ts l ogical  end, then Jensen and M urphy were out of  l ine  in  crit i­
cizing pay pract ice for performance insensi t iv i ty back in 1 990 .  But because 
Core, Guay, and Thomas did not l ike ly  intend this  i mp l i cation, their de­
tense of pay practice impl ic i t ly re l ies  on an expert ise-based argument : that 
Bebchuk and Fried, unl ike  Jensen and M urphy, have no bus iness attacking 
pay practice despite their  accurate diagnosis  of  executive power. Th is  im­
pl ic i t  assertion is  unpersuasive.  Bebchuk and Fried have stand i ng to ca l l  a 
windfa l l  a windfa l l .  
Fi nal ly,  Core, Guay, and Thomas ' s  "N irvana fal lacy" charge mi sses 
the mark . That accusation made sense forty years ago when post-New Deal 
pub l ic- interest regulators posi ted that real-world imperfect ions  would  
automatica l ly j usti fy regulat ion.  In  that era, c i t ing  the  N i rvana fal lacy im­
p l i ed that laissez-faire was cost benefic ia l-that is, effective in view of a 
cost-benefi t  analys is .  Bebchuk and Fried, in contrast, argue that cost­
benefic ia l  changes are within easy reach through free bargaining, making 
no p lea for d i rect  regul ation of contract term s .  
B .  Information Breakdom1s 
Rec a l l  Murphy " s  crit i c ism of stock-option compensat ion for l ower­
level employees .  For Murphy, the pers istence of pay arrangements that fail  
'' cost-benefi t  tes t  retlects  a lack of apprec iation of the costs .  Board mem­
t>:L; i ncorrectly be l ieve that stock opt ions  are a bargain mode of compensa­
r ion c:;;d o \·erest! mate the advantages of op t io n payments in C0 1:1parison to 
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cash payments by underestimating an opt ions '  cost to the shareho lders 
\Vhose stakes they di l ute .53  
Jensen and Murphy use this point  to account for a number o f  prac­
t ices .  For example ,  during the 1 990s, firms continued to grant the same 
number of stock options year after year,  even as their stock prices doub l ed, 
causi ng the value of incentive grants to bal l oon.  The n umber of options 
would have dropped as the market rose had pay plans been laser focused 
on performance sensit ivity. Contrariwise, when the market fel l  after 2 000, 
option value fel l  in l ockstep . Had the center of attent ion been value rather 
than numbers of shares,  upward adjustments would have been necessary -'� 
For Jensen and Murphy, the fal lacious "free money" v iew of options 
better accounts for prevai l ing compensation practice across the past fifteen 
years than power does. Lack of sophist ication also expla ins  the absence o f  
indexing: prior t o  200 5 ,  General ly Accepted Accounting Princip les 
(GAAP) required finns to expense the value of indexed options from the i r  
earnings but  d id  not  requi re deductions for fixed-price,  un indexed op­
tions 55 Boards thus gave up perfom1ance sensit ivity not because of CEO 
domination b�Jt because they were naively fixated on earnings per share 
( E P S )  and GAAP rules on EPS were i l l  conceived.56 
M urphy combines the i n fonnation-breakdown argument and the r i s k­
and-return argument to describe a robust bargaining dynamic .  A firm 
grants options not to i ncenti vize emp loyees but because options appe a r  to 
be cheap compensation . 5 7  I t  fol lows that concessions keyed to managers ' 
r isk aversion-the fixed exerc ise price set at the market and the absence of 
restraints on a l ienation-wi l l  l i tt le bother a firm that does not  view the 
concessions as costly .  Whi le  the manager would prefer an exerc i se price 
set be low the market the firm would prefer an exerc i se price a bove the 
market: they subsequently sp l i t  the d ifference when they set the price at the 
market. 5' 
Note that Murphy bas smuggled in a normative assertion . In his ac­
c o u n t  of 3 robust deal , the mistaken perception of low cost begins a :o a 
posit ive observation but transforms into a statement of  purpose.  For 
M urph y ,  equity compensat ion and cash compensation have the same s i m ­
ple  pU!vose-to compensate.  For  B ebchuk and Fried. i n  contrast. t he  pur­
pose of equ ity compensat ion i s  to incentivize; absent an incenti ve effe c t .  
nothing j usti fies b ig upside payoffs at  the shareholders · expense.  \V i t h  
5---!.. io'. at 3 7 .  indeed. i f  ll1dnag('n1cnt \\·ere i.! l l -pl)wcrfuL i. hc n1arkct dec l i ne �done :-:htlt.!ld i : �l\··-
t;au�ed �t gru;.;:' incrc�1�e in the nun1bcrs . 
�.; See Financia l  Ac•:ount ing S t amtm!:; Board. Statc:mcm t't" FinatKia!  .-\ccoun t ! 11g St·;n,b:·d:: ··.' < : .  
i � � · I .  Sh �lrc-lla:;cc! l)ay mcnt I re\ i sl'ci D e c .  200-1 ) . 
.:\h .  Set'. e .g . .  Jen:;�n 8.:. \1 urphy. sup.ru note 1 2 . a t  3 7- � l) -
-:, 7  \ l u r p h y .  supn.! n n t ('  2 :� .  a t  xr1-+-6 5 .  
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incentives a s  the sole purpose for equity-based pay, the pos i tive account 
takes on a different hue. Any instance of performance-insensit ive equity 
compensation impl ies  management empowerment . 
What then i s  the purpose of  equity-based pay-compensation  or in­
centive? ln a strict ly positive sense, the answer is  both .  But  in  a normative 
sense, the answer must be incentive under Murphy ' s  own analys i s .  He sees 
stock options as  an i ntrinsica l ly  ineffic ient form of compensation; they 
therefore only make sense if they cany incentives more valuab l e  than their 
opportunity cost .  In this view, it  fo l l ows that management p ower can be 
exc luded from a p l aus ib le  pos i t ive account only if ignorance independently 
explains everything.  
Bebchuk and Fried rej ect  this "honest stupidi ty" expl anat ion for five 
reasons ( 76-78,  1 47-48) .  F irst,  if lack of sophist icat ion were the cause, we 
would see fi rms use a wider range of  techniques, with more sophist icated 
firms offering p lans l ess  favorabl e  to managers and unsophist icated firms 
offering even more favorabl e  p l ans . 5 9  Second, if l ack  of knowledge were 
1:he cause, education woul d  be the obvious c ure, but Bebchuk and Fr ied see 
the probl em l ying at a deeper leve l .  Third, lack of sophisti cat ion is implau­
sible when most independent d i rectors are themselves C EOs-people  who 
presumab ly  are qui te sophisticated in matters related to executive compen­
sation. Fourth, g iven the prevalence of  C EOs with in  the ranks of independ­
ent directors, residual boardroom misunderstandings only further support 
Bebchuk and Fried ' s  rel i ance on C EO power as the explanation .  ff less  so­
phist icated directors misunderstand the economic ·impl icat ions of  stock 
options they approve despite read i ly  avai lable expert education,  then some 
other constrai nt must be skewing the approval process.  Fina l l y ,  as to the 
perverse e ffects of  the old GAAP rule  that required i ndexed options to be 
expensed but required no s imi lar deduction for unindexed options, 
Bebchuk and Fried ask why an independent board wou ld  focus on short­
term EPS ( impl icating only  numbers on a page ) instead of  on a long-tem1, 
value-enhancing strategy. Putting EPS first would make sense only if the 
stock rnarket very ineffic iently p unished the stock price for the E P S  sacri­
Cicc and i f  that s hort-term cost outweighed the performance benefit of in­
dex i ng ( 1 47-48 ) .  
These are strong points ,  but they are not strong enough to  defeat com­
o ktcly the explanatory force of  the ignorance-based argument .  B us iness 
pcopie do react d ifferent ly  to cash and scrip ,  and EPS does n1atter i n  the 
b<Jardroom, in part because it matters to noise traders in the m arkets . "\ )  I n  
addit ion, there i s  nothing new about management ' s  using options t o  \vrite 
l ha\ c a qucsr iun here .  G iven fi rn1 s ·  tendency to herd �tround focal-po i n t  su lu t iuns .  ignorance 
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scrip for i tse l f i n  order to explo i t  under-appreciat ion of the l ong-term eco­
nomic costs that bargain options impose on the rest of the shareho lders. 
Consider for exampl e  Delaware, which amended its corporate code to fa­
c i l itate the practice i n  the l ate 1 920s .  In  those days wanants d i stributed to 
ins iders in connection w ith new equity offerings faci l i tated exp lo i tat ion . 6 1  
B ut the economic princ ip les of this  pract ice do not  d iffer at a l l  from those 
that underl i e  stock-option compensat ion .  The practice ' s  persi stence sug­
gests that a boardroom seminar on bas ic  financial  economics  would fa l l  
short as a cure. For whatever reason,62 the economic costs o f  equity kickers 
are not perceived as equivalent to those of  cash payments. 
Admitting  lack of  sophist icat ion i nto the p i cture, however. only de­
tracts from a povver-based exp l anat ion if we nanowly  defi ne power as the 
authority to d irect the act ions of  others-the power of a sovere ign or a 
m i l i tary superior. for example. I f  we re l ax the defini t ion s l i ght ly  to de­
scribe power in  tenns of being in a position to exploit others economica l ly ,  
persi stent l ack of sophis t icat ion fits  neatl y  i nto Bebchuk and Fried ' s  de­
scription. Indeed, l ack  of sophist icat ion is nothing more than unequal  bar­
ga in ing power as understood i n  contract law. In  the end, then,  lack o f  
soph ist i cat ion and account ing concems dovetai l  n i c e l y  with B ebchuk a n d  
Fried ' s  explanation of  management power. 
N ow that GAAP requ i res the expensing of  opti on costs, we wi l l  get a 
real -worl d test of  these explanations .  Bebchuk and Fried \VOuld predict  no 
genera l move to indexing .  I jo in them. Today ' s  b oards lack the independ­
ence to ho ld  managers ' feet to the fire on  pay. Absent a s ign i ficant sh i ft in 
boardroom norms or radical  reform empowering shareho lders, the pract ice 
wi l l  not change materi a l ly .  
C. The Nonnotive ond Poiitico/ Em ·irunmenr 
J ust as management power is hard to prove, so is i ts presence hetrd to 
deny. Bebchuk and Fried ' s  interlocutors have by now conceded that power 
does help exp la in the problem of ineffic ient compensation -"] Disp ute con­
t i nues over power 's  impl i cations, and tha t  debate qu ick ly  expands to covc::r 
the governance system as a whol e .  To what extent does the sy stem s ucceed 
6 1 .  See Branon & !VkCa hery, supm note 1 3 . at 1 9 . 
6 � .  Concc:ms about cash tlows e'\plain  t h i s  i n  pan. 
h 3 .  S"'' C'LlJ'c ct a l . _ su;>m note G.  at 1 1 60-61 ( �1grce 1 n g  t h a t  r a y  :-aructurcs rctkct JlOII·cr �1 nd a 
pus i t i 1·c: u'rr.: btion lxtll·een power and pay ): H:1l l  & :VI urphv. su;m1 nolc J(, ,  at 27-2:-i ( rcponin>; 
:-;ynip�ltlly \\' i th the \' i C\\- that  p a y  dcc i s iuns  are n ot 111ack by �rul�,· indcrcndcnt biJard�. but  r.: � Jn '.,.:nd i r: � 
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\ ! urphy. supru iHJk' 1�.  �n 5.:t ( rccon11llCIH. i ing c hange:-; in  jlructural �1nd psycho!ogica !  c n , · i ron :n·�� n t  at�d 
n o t i n g  th�lt . .  l c ] hangc� in practices ,,· i l l  r.:quirc a n1aj or c h <1ngc in the  pO\\.lT rela t i onsh i p  bct\\·ccn the 
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or fai l in  cost-effectively channel ing the energy of empowered managers to 
product ive ends that serve the sharehol der interest? 
Answering th i s  question req uires a j udgment cal l .  B ebchuk and 
Fried's i nterlocutors stress  the b right s ide.  B engt Holmstrom and Steven 
Kaplan offer a prominent contribution.  They concede that some managers 
take excessive rewards,  that equity c ompensation of top executives is  more 
i iquid than s harehol ders would want, and that perverse ince nt ives have 
c ropped up in the form of accounting manipulat ion .6� But they c o ntend that 
s harehol ders should overall be  pleased w ith the way thi ngs have gone i n  
the last fifteen years . Returns, m easured net of the cost of executiv e  com­
pensation,  have been general ly  h igher s i nce the switch to opt ion-based 
compensa t i o n .  And the shift did succeed in al igning management interests 
\vi t h  those of the shareholders to a greater extent than in the past. 
Meanvvhi le .  from 1 992 to 2000, growth of the gross domestic  product in 
the United States was h igher than i n  Italy, France, B ritai n, G e rmany,  or 
Japan . F i nal ly, problems w ith executive compensat ion after 2 000 have 
mai n ly concemed isolated cases of abuse, and regulatory agen c i es have 
quickly addressed breakdo\'>'ns res ult ing from the strain of the 1 99 0 s '  boom 
market . ''5 Core.  Guay , and Thomas second th i s  v iew ,  noting that one can 
identi fy  a n d  deal  w ith cases vvhere h igh pay and poor performance coi n ­
c ide .  T h e  exi stence of bad apples,  they argue, does not compel t h e  conc l u ­
s i o n  th �u the  whole economy suffers from govemanc e  prob lems.61' 
M u rphy,  variously writing with Br ian Hal l  and M i c hael Jensen. aiso 
t;J l l mvs th i s ! inc  of reasoni ng, point ing to governance i mprovements i n i t i ­
�ltecl i n  t h e  1 990s :  boards became smaller a n d  more i ndependent, share­
ho lder:; became more vigi lant , compensation committees became the n o nT1, 
and kckra! disc losure regulations  required greater transparency than ever 
before ''- Sh areholders apparently welcomed the shi ft to opt ion compen sa­
tion as they enj oyed the bull market of the 1 990s.  In contrast, a much 
smal ler net pay i ncrease to management during the 1 980s had tri ggered a 
popul i s t  bac klash, due to the assoc iation of h i gh salaries with layo ffs. p lant  
11-'\. H ulnEtrom & Kapl::m. ,·upru note 5. at  3 -4 .  1 2- 1 4 . 
65.  !d �'t .1 -4. 
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c los ings ,  and downsizing.6� F o r  M urphy, outrage i s  more notable for its 
absence than for its l imiting role in respect to cunent pract ices 6'1 
B ebchuk and Fried deny none of  th is  but are unimpressed by apparent 
shareholder acquiescence. O utrage costs ,  they contend, do not regi ster for 
equity -based compensation because i t  i s  based on a sound idea ( 1 45 ) .  �u In  
any event, investors do not  find excess i ve or  distorted pay arrangements 
bothersome d uring bu l l  markets. M eanwhi l e ,  taking management rent seek­
ing together w ith the business wor ld ' s  tendency to fol low a norm of  con­
fom1ity, movement toward an equi l ibrium more responsive to shareho lders 
w i l l  be expectedly st icky.  Bebchu k  and Fri ed ' s  very purpose is to destab i ­
l i ze the  equi l i brium so as  to  j umpstart change (72 ,  74-76) .  
The tvvo s ides here debate the appropri ateness of c ontrasti n g  norm a­
t ive i nferences  drawn from a commonly he ld  posi t ive account.  There i s  no 
obj ect ive reso lut ion.  M eanwhi le ,  we shoul d  note the i nst itut ional  postures 
of the combating part ies .  Bebchu k  and Fried, legal academics ,  emerge as 
p i t -bu l l  moni tors of  boardroom p ract ice ,  re lentless ly making the case for 
shareholder value. Murphy and the other economists,  as apologists .  ap­
proach c ri t ic i sm of boards with c ircumspect ion,  even as they embrace the 
shareho lder-va lue norm . How should we account for the contrast') 
Fear of regulat ion helps to explain thi s  l aw/business sp l i t .  Je nsen and 
M urp hy suggested i n  thei r  famous paper of  1 990 that po l i t i ca l  forces Jed to  
performance- insensi t ive pay structures 7 1  The upper tai l o f  re\vard di stribu­
t ion tra i led off because employees, l abor unions,  consumer group:;,  
Congress .  and the media, a l l  wel l  informed clue to mandatory pub l i c  d isc l o ­
s ure, combined forces i n  th e  po l i ti ca l  m i l i e u  to constra in  the  effec t i veness 
o f  boards . " 2  Writ ing i n  2004,  Jensen and Murphy reca l l  in deta i l  the popu­
l i s t  outburst of the ear ly  1 990s,  mentioning not only leg i s lat i on c mlctcd m 
the t ime but an in i tiative that died i n  the House, a b i l l  that \Vou l d  h ave d is­
al lowed corporate tax deduct ions for any compensation exceeding that of  
the l owest-paid worker by a fac tor of  twenty-five .n  Murphy, looking back 
on the period,  has noted an overl ap between academic and popu l i st attacks 
on pay.  The academics wanted then, as they do now, perform ance sens i tiv­
Ity WJtllout concern about level  of pay, wh i l e  the popul i sts did not c a re 
about pay leve l ,  and adopted the academics '  performance-sens i t iv i ty 
ci:' . \·l u t-phy . .  wpm note 2 8 .  m I ;  .J ensen 8: 0/l urphy. suwa note i 2, at ! ( :•o i n t i ng  u u t  t he 
resurgence o t- oumrgc d i rected !0 the amuunt of pay in connection with recent ,;ca;�da l ,; ) .  Tkv .u·c 
i mpressed by the n cga t i 1 ·e pub l i c i ty attracted by the J ack W e l sh �l!ld Ric�hard Ctw;so rct t ccmcnt 
pad: ages. not ing t i lm nobody q uest ioned the qu<.tl i ty u f  the performance of e i ther. 
!ill .  \.lurphy. sup1 a nute 211. <.tt  8 5 5 - 5 6 .  
7 U .  O n e  might \\·e l l  cha l lenge Bebchuk a n d  Fried nn t h i s  pn in t .  who ·:cc:m : ( >  : J ,O'� I I i J': :h: t i  
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critique only a s  a means to capping executive pay.n One suspects that the 
specter of populis t  i ntervention lingers in the minds of those who resist 
Bebchuk and Fried' s reform initiative : reform talk rouses populism, and 
populism means deadweight loss as i t  lowers both pay levels and pay-to­
perfom1ance sensit ivity.75 
L ike the concept of power, the impact of politics, the force of popu­
l ism. and the likelihood of regulation are all difficult to observe and there­
fore difficult to gauge. But one could reasonably expect general agreement 
on the proposition that the likelihood of political intervention increases 
with the level of outrage over management misbehavior. Thus does the 
absence of outrage over recent pay practice, emphasized by Bebchuk and 
Fr ied ' s opponents, reemerge to suggest that any fear over the � ·populist 
th reat" is  presently overstated. Shareholder capitali sm is  a public as well as 
a private phenomenon. Median voter demands have moved away from 
early- and mid-twentieth century populist concerns over b ig business and 
l abor relations. The polit ics of the Enron scandal show that shareholder 
value tends to drive national polit ical demands. We have indeed seen a re­
cen t spate of popular outrage, but reporting breakdowns triggered this an­
ger. Today ' s  populi st agenda concerns compliance vvith laws des igned to 
assure accurate market prices .  Outrage in the 1 990s concerned pay practice 
only to the extent it contributed to short-tenn focus on stock prices and re­
porting failures, not because it implicated a wealth transfer from working 
peop le .  
Legi s latures responded by building in more shareholder responsive­
ness through strengthened committee systems and extended shareholder 
rat ification requircments 7" Only two sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
c lamp down on pay-those prohibit ing loans to execut ives and those dis­
gorging i nc:;:ntive compensation triggered by accounting restatements .77  
N either res triction inhibits the level of pay. And in any event, the surge of 
nco-populist political energy has abated. Management is retuming to i ts  
acc;Jstomccl place of political influence in  Washington .7'  Thus,  a refractory 
fear  of popu i ist h ordes seems unfounded. The question in this  debate i s  
seriously one should take shareholder value. 
7-+ .  \ i u rphy. supru note 2 R .  at 2 2 .  
7 ::. .  C/. id. a t  �::. ! . 
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S lack in the govemance system l engthens during bull markets. When 
the stock price goes up, few investors quest ion generous p ay deals. M arket 
reversals,  in contrast, trigger h eightened scrutiny of govemance p racti ces­
and not j ust from with i n  the financial  community. Scrutiny becomes espe­
c i al l y  exacting when market reversals  coincide with well-pub l ic ized cases 
o f  executive noncomp l iance with the law. But when the market recovers 
and memories of scandal fade,  management regains its  pol i t ical  i nfl uence 
and good govemance l oses its prominence on the p o l it ical agenda . 
We see this  pattem i n  the recent twists and turns of the executive-pay 
debate . Some sign ificant adj ustments have crept into the financia l  eco­
nomic defense, at least as Professor Murphy and M ichael Jensen presented 
i t  i n  a co-written paper in 2 004. At the same time, the p o l i t ical  environment 
after the 2004 e lection looks friend l i er to management, foreboding negative 
implications for B ebchuk and Fried' s  reform agenda. 
A. Jensen and Mwphy and the Normative Cycle 
Murphy has long been a crit ic o f  the boardroom negotiating environ­
ment, even as h e  has defended i t  against B ebchuk and Fri ed. H e  has ac­
knowledged that CEOs exercise influence over the pay-setting process, 
pointing out that pay recommendations emanate from firms' h uman­
resources departments (working in tandem with outsi de consultants ) and 
pass through a management-approval stage b e fore going on to boards. 7'1 
M urphy has sharply critic ized the survey evidence presented to j usti fy pay 
increases, pointing out the nanow compass of criteria referenced i n  deter­
m i ning level s  of pay. He also has cri t ic ized the ratchet effect across certain 
industries : R0 a p ay i ncrease in one fi rm often triggers i ndustry-wide in­
cre ases because the industry ' s  finns gauge their  competitiveness by refer­
ence to one another. Despite these crit ic isms, M urphy made no concessi ons 
o n  the basic question of the legitimacy of pay increases, at l east prior to 
2004. H e  then admitted that compensation committees tend to eJT o n  the 
h i gh s ide and wi l l  always defer to m an agement given a choice between a 
s l i ghtly inferior p l an the C E O  favors and a more sensible p lan . Yet M urphy 
rej ected the "cynical scenario" o f  "entrenched compensation committees 
rubber-stamping increasi n gly lucrative pay programs . " :-: 1  For M u rphy, the 
approving directors were "keenly aware of the conflicts of interest betvveen 
m anagers and shareholders over the level of pay," and management influ­
ence did not mean a conupt process or systemic t�1 i l ure .oc Even though 
79. M urphy. supra note 8. at  24 .  
00 .  ld 3 !  9 .  
S 1 .  ld at 2 5 .  
� 2 .  l d  at 24. 
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tru l y  i ndependent boards d id n o t  make t h e  dec i s ions a t  ann ' s  l ength , rent 
extraction did not afford a comp e l l i ng exp lanat ion  for the prac t i c e . 8-' 
Writ ing v, i th Jensen in 2004, M urphy describes the same p rocess  i n ­
firmities a n d  cont inues t o  stress the good fai th  of compensat ion-commi ttee 
memb ers . '� B ut negative character izat ions  have crept i nto the n ormati v e  
bottom l i n e :  ' ·the governance system i tse lf  i s  cotTupted a n d  t i l ted i n  t h e  
d irect ion of management in  a w a y  t h a t  w i l l  a l most i nevitabl y  l ead to  e x ­
cesses in executive pay level s,"K5 req u i ring a change in t h e  very structure of 
the evaluat ion and pay-sett ing process s6 L ucrative termi nat ion agreements 
eam Jensen and M urphy ' s  s trongest condemnation-as they are so 
· 'extreme'' and "abus ive" as to " c a l l  i nto quest ion the i ntegrity o f  important 
parts of the remuneration proc ess . · '�'  Jensen and M urphy also are h ighly 
cr i t ica l  of the expert ise and negot iat i ng s k i l l s  of c ompensat ion committees,  
whi c h  they see as part icu lar l y  l i ke ly  to g i ve away the store when h i ring 
outs ide executives . S k i l led  profess ional  negoti ators represent i ncoming 
C EO s  and run r ings around the h iring company, which i t se l f  pays the nego­
t iator' s fee .  J ensen and M urphy recommend that boards refuse to pay the 
fee and h i re the i r  mvn profess ional contract ing agents . '�: B u t  Jensen and 
M urphy concede nothing i n  their  final evaluation,  ins is t ing that "poor 
negotiat ing expert ise'' prov i des a b etter explanation than board c apt i v i ty . :-:'" 
V iews have a lso s h i fted on the cruc i a l  matter of stock-opt i o n  des ign .  
Some years ago . M urphy j udged p revai l i ng stock-option pract ice  favorab ly 
when compared to al ternati ves i mporti n g  greater performance sens i t i v i ty .  
Overal l evidence, he  said .  supported t h e  b a s i c  hypothe s i s  that e q uity incen­
t i ves drove managemen t perfo rmance. B ut l i tt le  eviden ce supported the  
propos i t ion that more aggress i ve perforrnance-bascd p lans  would  enhance 
expected shareholder ret u rn s . '10 In  M urphy ' s  sche mata, i ndex i n g  alone 
would not  be a Pareto i mprovement because the corporat ion would have to 
compensate for the i ncreased r i s k  w i th an i ncreased payoff to the execu­
t ive . ' ) \  The more recent J ensen and M u rphy paper, in contrast, strongly ad­
vocates i ndexing,  bac k i ng a form ula t ied to the finn · s  cost o f  equi ty capi ta l  
net of the d i v i dend y i e ld . 9c Jensen and Mtuvhy a lso  1 10\V support restra ints 
x 3 .  Ha l l  & \'lurphy ,  supm note 27 .  at 27-2 R .  
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on alienation, calling for ongoing monitoring of executives' portfolios and 
a ban on hedging risk in the capital markets .93 They also concede the dan­
ger of insider trading, endorsing Fried's suggestion of p re-trading disclo­
sure ?' 
We see a similar shift on restricted stock .  Murphy formerly projected 
that if executives and finns were left free to bargain in a space undistorted 
by the accounting and tax regimes, then restricted stoc k  would replace 
stock options . '6 Restri cted stock, Murphy claimed, better addressed execu­
t ives' r isk aversion; it imported more stable incentives, holding o ut gain on 
both the upside and the downside without perverse incentives for invest­
ment policy.96 Now, writ ing with Jensen, Murphy denounces restricted 
stock as a giveaway, c i t ing the same problem Bebchuk and Fried note q� 
For Jensen and Murphy, the cure lies in making sure that the executive 
really does make a tradeoff rather than simply receiving equi ty compensa­
t ion as a free add-on to cash salary. Thus, salary and b onus payments 
should be formally exchanged for options or restricted stock . l)� Bebchuk 
and Fried vvould not disagree .  
J ensen and Murphy do retain M lll'J-ihy' s earlier infonnation-based 
characterization of the problem, even as they step up the cr i ticism of the 
p ract ice and ackno\v ledge management intluence .  They avoid using the 
term " ren t' '  and attribute the mess to lack of information and b argain ing  
expert ise .  Jensen and M urphy underscore this position at  the prescript ive 
level : s ince the problem results from defic ient expertise and information, 
enhanced board independence will not, by i tself import a so lutio n . y9 
Jensen and M urphy concede every salient point except the final 
deduct ion as to the source of the prob lem. Avo iding recomse to a charac­
terization of the problem as one of ' 'power,"  they say boards j usr do not 
"get it . " This i s  true i n  a sense :  if  all the boards wake up tomorrO\v and ' ·get 
it" they will indeed possess legally vested ' 'power·' to change t h e  practice .  
But crit ical questions ari se .  F i rst , why has th is not happened already' )  
Second, how can we expect boards to be sufficiently motivated-absent 
enhanced independence-to invest in the expertise and information neces­
sary to · 'get it' ' and so lve the problem? lf the economics of coq::,orate 
govemance teach us anything, it is that agency problems w i l l  not be so lved 
unless actors have an i ncentive to solve them. The necessary technologies 
are on  the she l f  and the compensation-consulting finns would be happy to 
_, __ __ __ _ 
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sel l them. There i s  no suppl y-s ide problem;  rather demand i s  w h at i s  miss­
ing.  Bebchuk and Fried ' s  book explains i ts absence, answering the q ues­
tion as to why boards do not "get i t ." We can se lect from a \vhole  pa le tte of 
terms in  exp lain ing why-influence, dominance ,  imbalance, t i l t ,  skew, 
agency cost, and, yes, pmver. 
B. Bebchuk and Fried and the Political Cn'ie 
Bebchuk and Fried offer a menu of govemance i mprovements . Some 
of these woul d  tweak the present system to make i t  more l ike ly that the 
shareholder voice  registers ins ide boardrooms. For exampl e ,  transparency 
cou ld be enhan ced,  share holders b e i ng un l ikely to compla in  about p ractices 
they cannot see.  A l l  compensation could  be reported with a do l l ar va lue 
attached, and the corporation cou ld  report executi ve s t o c k  sales  d i rect ly 
( 1 92 -94 ) . In  addition, the shareho lder vote could become more meaningfu l ,  
with separate votes on d ifferent segments of compensat ion p l ans g iv ing 
shareholders the opportunity to p inpoint obj ect ionable  provis ions ( 1 97) .  
Other proposals on t h e  menu are more radical  and would empower the 
sh areho lders, fundamenta l ly  changing the system. At present,  shareh o l ders 
have no power to place binding resol utions on the bal l ot at  the an n u a l  
meeting.  Bebchuk and Fried would re lax t h i s  constraint to permit  b ind ing 
shareholder in i t iatives on compensation ( 1 98 ) .  They wou ld  not  s top there. 
They would break the board ' s  lega l ly  vested agenda contro l over i m portant 
corporate legi s lat ion so that shareholders could propose ch arter amend­
m e n ts that removed provis ions that entrench management ( 2 1 1 - 1 2 ) .  
Fina l ly. shareholders should be granted access to  the bal l ot on terms 
broader than those recent ly proposed by the Secur i ties and E-..;.c hange 
Commiss ion  ( 2 1  0 ) .  
Others are debating t h e  costs and benefi ts  of sharehol der­
empo werment measures in various arenas . 1 1 11 1  Here I note on ly  t\VO poi nts.  
F i rs t . po l i t i cal  feasib i l ity presents a more monumental stum b l ing block to­
cby than i t  did only two years ago. The post-Enron po l i t i cal  c l i mate has 
faded. and management i n tl uence again registers .1 1 1 1 Just a s  corporate d i rec­
tors  lack i ncentives to app.reciate the opportunity costs when they pay em­
p loyees in equi ty scrip.  so too do po l i t ic ians lack i ncent i ves-absent the 
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shock of maj o r  l osses and po l i t ical  scandal- to apprec iate the  opportunity 
costs of poor governance inst i tut ions .  Pay Without Performance appears 
l ate  in the reform cycle , but i t  has a l ready j o lted actors at the S EC into re­
th inki ng the i r  d isc losure mandates to i mport greater transparency . 1 0" 
D isclosure reform sti l l  may have a reasonable chance of  success .  But  the 
more radical  proposals  on the menu look more vis ionary every day . Thus 
does the separation of  ownership and contro l return at the end of the d is­
cussion not on ly  to he lp  us d iagnose the problem but to exp la in  why i t  re­
mains unsolved. 
Second, boardroom power rel at ionships can change . H ierarch ica l  di­
rect ive i s  not the only way to i mprove pract ices .  Sometimes communica­
tive action can do the j ob . 1 0� I t  fo l lows that fai l ure for Bebchuk and Fried 's  
radical  shareholder empowerment agenda does  not necessari l y  imply  fai l ­
ure for the argument i n  favor of performance-sensi t ive pay. T o  b e  s ure, 
rad ica l  steps to empower shareho l ders would hasten movement to a more 
p roductive resu l t .  But  persistent, cogent cr i t ic ism has affected corporate 
govemance-inc ludi ng pay pract ice-in the past. I t  certa in ly  could do so 
again ,  causing boards to insist  on incremental i mprovements in the design 
o f  pay packages . I t  is at th i s  level that Bebchuk and Fr ied w i l l  l ikely make 
t h e  b iggest impact.  
CONCLUS ION 
The c loser o n e  looks at  the  debate o v e r  executive pay, the  smal ler the 
substa n t i ve st akes appear. Bebchuk and Fr ied make no attempt to  deny the 
presence of the factors their interlocutors emphasize. and subsequent ly .  the 
i n terl ocutors have moderated their object ions .  jensen and M urphy. in thei r  
rec e nt writing. g o  s o  far a s  to note that the ir  account i s  cons isten t with 
B e bchuk and Fried ' s  and only obj ec t  that the l atter pair  ' · somnvhat over­
state[s]" the case in not  expla in ing why stock opti ons exp l oded in  the 
1 990s . 1 "-1 Bu t . as a l l agree, an h i stori cal  sh i ft toward shareho lder respon­
s i ve ness occurred in the wake of the takeover wars of the 1 980s,  clue in  no 
sma l l  part to the i n tl ucnce of writers l ike j ensen and M urphy.  M anagement 
i n corporated shareho lder- v a l ue maximizat ion into its own j ob descript ion,  
pursuing vol untari ly  matters l ike  unbund l ing and cost reduct ion that the 
market for corporate control had once forc ib ly i mposed. But that  normat ive 
s h i ft to s h areholder  capita l i sm occurred with in  fami l iar  and com fortab ie  
prec i nc ts .  fvhmagement retained considerabl e  boardroom in tluence and 
[OUk  the occas ion  to e\.tract a substant ia l  raise .  a ra i se  which ·would  n o t  
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have been forthcoming to a p arty lacki n g  bargai ning power. T o  take the 
shareho l der-va lue  nonn seriously is  to fo l l ow B ebchuk and Fried and to get 
serious about performance sensit ivity. 
